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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3251 
_____________ 
 
BALJIT SINGH, 
                        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                              Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
A088-231-521 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
January 9, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: February 22, 2012 ) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Baljit Singh appeals the Decision and Order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his 
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 
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Torture (“CAT”).  For the following reasons, we deny the petition and affirm the decision 
of the BIA.
1
  
I. 
 Because we write only for the parties, we discuss only those facts to the extent 
necessary for the resolution of the issues raised on appeal.  
 Singh entered the United States on October 3, 2006 from the Hoshipur Province in 
India.  In February 2007, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to 
Appear, charging that he was an alien present in the United States without being admitted 
or paroled, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Singh conceded the charge of 
removability, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT.  The 
Immigration Judge held a hearing on Singh’s application. 
 At the hearing, Singh testified that he fled India and was afraid to return because 
he refused to join his village’s ruling party .  Specifically, he said that the Congress Party, 
the ruling party at the time, harassed, arrested, and beat him because he refused to join 
them.  On one occasion, he was injured and his mother treated him. On another occasion 
he sought medical treatment at a local hospital.   
Singh also testified that his brother was similarly harassed.  He also testified that 
he fears returning to India because the Congress Party is still in power and that he has 
been informed that the authorities are still looking for him.   
                                              
1
 The BIA had jurisdiction over Singh’s appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).   
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 The IJ issued an oral decision denying his application.  Specifically, the IJ found 
that Singh was not credible, had not presented sufficient corroborating testimony, and had 
not established future fear of persecution under CAT.  As to Singh’s credibility, the 
Immigration Judge highlighted three inconsistencies in his testimony.  First, he noted that 
Singh was inconsistent with the name of the hospital where he was treated.  He testified 
that the name of the hospital was Pala Tanda, but the medical record shows it was Bhela 
Maternity and General Hospital.  Also, Singh was inconsistent about the amount of time 
he spent in the hospital.  He testified he slept in the hospital for two nights, yet the record 
he submitted showed he was there only one night.  Finally, the IJ found there to be 
inconsistencies in the manner in which Singh crossed the border.  In his asylum 
application, Singh stated that he arrived in the United States by ship.  Before the IJ, he 
testified he arrived in the United States by car. 
 As to corroboration, the IJ determined that Singh could have, but failed to, provide 
corroboration for his testimony regarding the first aid rendered by his mother and the 
harassment his brother suffered at the hands of Congress party members.  He stated that 
his mother treated his injuries and submitted an affidavit from his mother.  The affidavit 
made no mention of providing any treatment.  Further, Singh named only his brother as 
someone who was similarly harassed.  However, Singh did not provide an affidavit from 
him corroborating his experience.  The IJ found that while Singh did not speak to his 
brother, his parents did and he could have gotten an affidavit from his brother through 
that channel.  Finally, the IJ determined that Singh had failed to establish he had a well-
founded fear of future harm and thus relief under CAT was unwarranted.   
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 Based on the above, the IJ denied the application.  The BIA affirmed the IJ on all 
grounds.  This appeal followed.  
II.  
When the BIA issues an opinion, we review that decision.  Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y 
Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de 
novo, subject to the appropriate deference, and we review the BIA’s factual finding for 
substantial evidence.  Id.  Under the “substantial evidence” standard, we reverse only if a 
“reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Id. (quoting 
Toure v. Att'y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
Adverse credibility findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.  
Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Because Singh filed 
his application after 2005, the REAL ID Act applies.  See Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 
185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  Under the Act, an IJ’s adverse credibility determination may be 
based on any inconsistencies in the record, without regard to whether they relate to the 
heart of the applicant’s claim.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   
Even if the testimony is credible, Singh may still be required to corroborate 
aspects of his testimony in order to meet his burden of proof.  Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 
F.3d 246, 252 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).  Our review of such a determination is subject to the 
same substantial evidence standard as a credibility determination.  Id. An applicant must 
provide such evidence when “it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence and there 
is no satisfactory explanation for its absence,” such as when the testimony is “central to 
an applicant’s claim and easily subject to verification.”  Id. at  252.  An IJ is obligated to 
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undertake a three-part inquiry before concluding that, because of a lack of corroborating 
evidence, an applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof: “(1) identify the testimony 
for which it is reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration; (2) examine 
whether the applicant corroborated that testimony; and (3) analyze whether the applicant 
has adequately explained any failure to provide corroboration.”  Id. at 253.   
A.  
To qualify for asylum, Singh must show that he is “unable or unwilling to return to 
[India] ... because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). An applicant’s failure to 
demonstrate eligibility for asylum necessarily means that he failed to meet the higher 
burden of proof for statutory withholding of removal. See Mudric v. Attorney General, 
469 F.3d 94, 102 n.8 (3d Cir.2006).  
While not a particularly compelling adverse credibility finding, we cannot say that 
the record compels a different conclusion.  For example, in his asylum application, Singh 
said he arrived in the United States by ship, A.R. 000298, but testified that he crossed the 
border in a car, A.R. 000136-37.  When the IJ confronted him about this inconsistency 
and elicited further testimony, his story changed several times.  He said he arrived by 
ship, then changed his testimony to he arrived by taxi and then boarded and waited on a 
ship.  While this does not go to the heart of the Singh’s claim and strikes us as relatively 
minor, this inconsistency combined with the other minor inconsistencies, does not 
compel a conclusion that Singh is credible.   
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Even if the testimony was credible, the BIA’s determination that Singh failed to 
present readily available corroborating testimony is also supported by substantial 
evidence.  In his testimony, Singh referenced that his brother was similarly mistreated for 
his unwillingness to be politically active, yet he did not provide any documentation 
corroborating his story.  When the IJ probed further, Singh indicated he did not have 
contact with his brother but his parents, whom Singh was in contact with, did.  Thus, the 
IJ’s determination that Singh failed to corroborate his testimony is supported by 
substantial evidence.  
III. 
We have considered Singh’s remaining arguments and find them without merit.  
We will deny the petition.   
